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Comment
Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss: Cutting Away the
Protective Mantle of Gertz
In the twenty-two years since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,I the
Supreme Court has been unable to establish a framework for defamation
law that effectively accommodates both the first amendment values of
free expression and debate and the societal interest in protecting the reputation of the individual. The rules for recovering damages are varied
and uncertain. Even when the appropriate rule is clear, the parties can2
not rely on a judge or jury to apply the standard of liability correctly,
making prediction of the likely result in a defamation action extremely
difficult.3 In addition, neither the first amendment nor the individual's
reputation interest is well-served by the vast amounts of time and money
required to vindicate either the reputation of the defamed or the conduct
of the publisher.
A recent United States Supreme Court decision in the defamation
area, Dun & Bradstreet,Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,Inc.,4 further complicates this uncertain and unpredictable area of law. Greenmoss presented
the Supreme Court with an opportunity to clarify whether the standard
of liability for private individual plaintiffs set forth in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.5 applied to actions brought against both media and nonmedia
defendants. Instead, a plurality of the Court decided the case on the basis
of a resurrected constitutional distinction between expressions on matters
of public concern and expressions on matters of private concern. 6 The
Court held that recovery of presumed and punitive damages is constitu1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. In one case, a jury awarded the plaintiff $250,000 in general damages and $1.8 million
in punitive damages because it believed that the Washington Post had to prove that its story
was true and found that it had not done so. Brill, Inside the Jury Room at the Washington
Post Libel Trial, AM. LAW., Nov. 1982, at 1; see also Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan
Reconsidered: Time to Return to "the CentralMeaningof the FirstAmendment, " 83 COLUM.
L. REV. 603, 613 (1983) ("The leaked secrets of the jury room [at the Post trial] ... give us
dramatic evidence in support of a conclusion that libel lawyers had already reached: When a
case goes to a jury, the Sullivan rule means little or nothing.").
3. See Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Litigation, 1980
AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 455.

4. 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
5. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
6. Greenmoss, 105 S.Ct. at 2945-46.
[1171]
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tionally permissible absent a showing of "actual malice" when the defamatory statements do not involve matters of public concern. 7 This holding
raises many new uncertainties; in following Greenmoss, courts will continue struggling to arrive at a fair accommodation of free speech and
reputation.
This Comment begins with a background discussion of the development of American defamation law. After discussing the decision and
reasoning of the Greenmoss plurality, the Comment criticizes the decision and discusses the uncertainties it raises. The Comment concludes
that the Greenmoss approach should be abandoned and that the rules set
forth in Gertz should be applied to all actions brought by private individuals, regardless of the defendant's status or the content of the defamation. Thus, liability should not be imposed without proof of fault in any
damages should never be
defamation action, and presumed or punitive
8
awarded without proof of actual malice.
A Brief History of American Defamation Law
At common law, 9 a defamation action permitted an individual to
recover damages for a false statement of fact10 that "tend[ed] so to harm
the reputation ...as to lower him in the estimation of the community or
11 Truth
to deter third persons from associating or dealing with 1 him."
2
was an absolute defense in a civil action for defamation.
Several absolute privileges developed at common law to protect the
publishers of various types of statements. Immunity from liability for
defamation extended to communications made during judicial and legislative proceedings, statements made by high government officials, communications made with the consent of the plaintiff, and communications
7. Id. at 2946.
8. See infra note 189 & accompanying text.
9. In England, a cause of action for defamation has existed since the thirteenth century.
Slander was actionable in the seignoral courts that were established to resolve disputes between
the lord and his tenants or among tenants. Upon the demise of the seignoral courts, slander
was dealt with first in the ecclesiastical courts and then in the common-law courts. Libel, a
written defamation, was first penalized by the court of Star Chamber. See Veeder, The History

and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 546 (1903); see also Lovell, The
"Reception" of Defamation by the Common Law, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1962). See generally J. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 11-27, 110-15, 364-74 (2d
ed. 1979); 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 25-54 (4th ed. 1971).
10. A spoken defamation is "slander," and a written defamation is "libel." W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 751 (4th ed. 1971). While there are still common-law differences in the treatment of libel and slander, see id. at 752-54, there is no distinction relevant to this Comment, and the term "defamation" will be used to refer to either.
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
12. Id. § 581A; W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 116, at 796-99. In English and early
American common law, truth was not a defense to a criminal libel or sedition charge. See id.

at 796-97.
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between husband and wife.1 3 These privileges today vary from state to
4
state.'

Qualified or conditional privileges also have been allowed for certain
communications. 15 These privileges protect the publisher from liability
unless the plaintiff can show that the publisher either acted with malice
or exceeded the reasonable scope of the privilege.1 6 Most jurisdictions
provide conditional privileges for those communications made either in
the speaker's self-interest or the common interests of the speaker and
audience, statements made in the discharge of some duty, expressions of
"fair comment" on matters of public concern, and reports of public
proceedings.17
At common law, the successful plaintiff could recover three different
types of damages. Special damages were available to compensate the
plaintiff for provable out-of-pocket losses.1 8 Presumed damages were
awarded to the defamation victim when actual damage to reputation was
impossible to prove but "from the character of the defamatory words and
the circumstances of the publication, it is all but certain that serious
harm [had] resulted." 19 Finally, punitive damages could be awarded
20
when the conduct of the wrongdoer was particularly malicious.
Each state developed its own variation on this general common-law
scheme without interference from the federal government until New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan 21 was decided in 1964. The Court previously had
held that defamation was not "within the area of constitutionally protected speech";22 however, in New York Times, the Court abandoned this
13. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 114, at 776-85; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 585-592A.

14. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 114, at 776-85.
15. In general, qualified or conditional privileges were allowed for those communications
"fairly made by a person in the discharge of some public or private duty, whether legal or
moral, or in the conduct of his own affairs, in matters where his interest is concerned." Toogood v. Spyring, 1 C. M. & R. 181, 193, 149 Eng. Rep. 1044, 1049-50 (1834).
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 599-605A; see also W. PROSSER, supra note
10, § 115, at 792.
17. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 115, at 785; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 594-598A.
18. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 112, at 760-62; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 622.
19. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 112, at 765. Damages could be presumed in all libel
cases, id. § 112, at 752, and in slander cases in which the imputation of a criminal act, a
loathsome disease, business misconduct, or sexual unchastity was made. In all other slander
cases, harm to reputation had to be proven. Id. § 112, at 754.
20. L. ELDRIDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 95, at 537-41 (1978); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 621 comment d, 908.

21. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
22. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) (citing Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250, 266 (1952)); see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). In
Chaplinsky,the Court noted that "[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Consti-
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imposes constitutional limitaposition and held that the first amendment
23
tions on state defamation laws.

In the New York Times case, an Alabama police commissioner
brought a defamation action against the New York Times 24 for publishing an advertisement alleging civil rights violations by his department.
Because Alabama's "fair comment" 2 5 privilege protected only expressions based on true statements of fact, 26 the jury found liability solely on

the basis of some relatively minor inaccuracies in the ad 27 and awarded
$500,000 in damages. The Alabama Supreme
Commissioner Sullivan
28
Court affirmed.

The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the first
amendment limited the states' power to award damages in defamation
actions brought by public officials. 2 9 The Court reasoned that the
"profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" 30 required that erroneous statements of fact be protected to give freedom of expression the
"breathing space" it needed to survive.3 1 A defamation law requiring the
critics of a public official to prove the truth of their assertions would
32
result in a self-censorship incompatible with the first amendment.
Thus, the New York Times Court held that a public official could not
recover any damages-special, presumed, or punitive-for a defamatory
falsehood "unless he prove[d] that the statement was made with 'actual
malice'[,] .. with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
'3 3
of whether it was false or not."

In later cases, the Court interpreted the "actual malice" requiretutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words .... " Id. at 571-72.
23. 376 U.S. at 264.
24. A number of the individuals who sponsored the ad were also named in the suit. Id. at
256-57.
25. At common law, a qualified privilege called "fair comment" protected criticism or
expressions of opinion on matters of public concern. The critic was protected as long as the
opinion was sincerely held and was not expressed for the sole purpose of causing harm to its
target. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comment a; see also W. PROSSER, supra
note 10, § 115, at 792.
26. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 267; Parsons v. Age-Herald Publishing Co., 181 Ala.
439, 450, 61 So. 345, 350 (1913).
27. The New York Times opinion noted that respondent Sullivan's own proof tended to
show that the advertisement was "substantially correct." New York Times, 376 U.S. at 289.
28. 273 Ala. 656, 687, 144 So. 2d 25, 52 (1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
29. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 283. The first amendment "was fashioned to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by
the people." Id. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
30. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270.
31. Id. at 271-72.
32. Id. at 278-79.
33. Id. at 279-80.
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ment to be a highly demanding standard of proof. In Garrison v. Louisiana,34 a criminal libel case, the Court equated "reckless disregard" for
the truth with a "high degree of awareness of [the statement's] probable
falsity."'35 Four years after Garrison, the Court required that a public
official present sufficient evidence to establish that the defendant
"enter'36
tained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.
Subsequent cases extended the reach of the New York Times "actual
malice" requirement by providing a broad standard for determining who
is a "public official."'37 In Rosenblatt v. Baer,38 the Court upheld the
application of the New York Times standard to the former supervisor of a
county-owned ski area who was criticized for mismanagement. The
Court ruled that the public official designation applied "at the very least"
to government employees who "have, or appear to the public to have,
substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of government
'39
affairs."
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts4° and its companion case, Associated Press v. Walker,4 1 the Supreme Court held that the New York Times
"actual malice" requirement applied to "public figures" as well as "public officials." 42 Chief Justice Warren observed that "public figures, like
public officials, often play an influential role in ordering society" and that
"many who do not hold public office.., are nevertheless intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions. ' 43 Accordingly,
the Court extended the New York Times "actual malice" requirement to
public figures to provide "an important safeguard for the rights of the
press and public to inform and be informed on matters of legitimate
interest."44
Thus both public officials and public figures were required to show
34. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
35. Id. at 74.
36. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
37. In New York Times, the Court found it unnecessary "to determine how far down into
the lower ranks of government employees the 'public official' designation would extend for
purposes of this rule, or otherwise to specify categories of persons who would or would not be
included." 376 U.S. at 283 n.23.
38. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
39. Id. at 85.
40. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The suit was brought by Wally Butts, a college athletic director
and former football coach.
41. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Edwin Walker was a former major general in the United States
Army.
42. Id. at 155.
43. Id. at 164-65 (Warren, CJ., concurring). In separate opinions, Justice Black, joined
by Justice Douglas, and Justice Brennan, joined by Justice White, concurred in Chief Justice
Warren's rationale for applying the Times standard to public figures. Id. at 170, 172.
44. Id. at 164-65. The Chief Justice also noted that public figures "have as ready access
as 'public officials' to mass media of communication, both to influence policy and to counter
criticism of their views and activities." Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
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"actual malice" to obtain any damages-special, presumed, or punitive-in a defamation action. Until 1971, however, the Court had not
addressed whether the New York Times actual malice requirement extended to defamation actions brought by private individuals against
either media or nonmedia defendants.
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,4 5 the Court addressed this question for the first time. Rosenbloom, a distributor of "nudist" magazines
who was acquitted of criminal obscenity charges, sued a radio station
that, in reporting his arrest, characterized him as a "girlie-magazine peddler" and a "smut distributor. '4 6 The Supreme Court affirmed the Third
Circuit's application of the New York Times standard, even though no
claim was made that Rosenbloom was a public figure. 47 The plurality
held that the New York Times "actual malice" standard applied to defamation actions whenever the expression concerned a matter of public or
general interest.4 8 Rosenbloom thus rejected the distinction between public figures and private figures 49 and shifted the basis of the "actual malice" requirement from the status of the plaintiff to the subject matter of
the defamatory falsehood.5 0
The Court repudiated the rationale of the Rosenbloom plurality only
three years later in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.5 1 Before Rosenbloom
reached the Supreme Court, Elmer Gertz, a Chicago attorney, brought a
defamation action against the publisher of a John Birch Society magazine, The American Opinion. In that magazine, Gertz was falsely accused of being the architect of a Communist campaign to discredit the
Chicago Police Department. 52 The jury awarded Gertz $50,000 after
5 3
finding that he had been defamed and that he was not a public figure.
The district court subsequently determined that the New York Times
"actual malice" requirement should apply to expressions on any public
issue, that the defamation involved such an issue, and that Gertz had
45. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
46. Id. at 32-36.
47. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 415 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1969), aff d, 403 U.S. 29
(1971).
48. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 44-45. The plurality reasoned that if the New York Times
policy upholding "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate were to be preserved, constitutional protection must be extended "to all discussion and communication involving matters of
public or general concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous." Id.
49. Id. at 47-48.
50. Id. at 44. However, the Court expressly reserved the question of what standard of
proof would apply when the subject matter of the defamation was not within the area of public
or general interest. Id. at 44 n. 12.
51. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
52. Id. at 325-26.
53. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 997, 998 (N.D. Ill. 1970), affTd, 471 F.2d
801 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 418 U.S. 323 (1973).
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failed to meet the New York Times burden. Accordingly, it entered a
54
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
While Gertz' appeal was pending before the Seventh Circuit, the
Supreme Court announced the Rosenbloom decision.5 5 The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's ruling in Gertz on the ground that Rosenbloom required application of the New York Times standard to any
expression on a matter of public interest.5 6 The Supreme Court, dissatisfied with the results of the rule set forth in Rosenbloom, granted
57
certiorari.
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit and set forth two
new rules for defamation actions brought by private individuals. First,
states could define their own standard of liability for defamation of private individuals "so long as they do not impose liability without fault."5 8
Second, a private defamation claimant who established liability under a
standard less demanding than the New York Times "actual malice" requirement could recover only actual damages. 59 Thus, even a private
individual was required to show New York Times "actual malice" to re60
cover presumed or punitive damages.
The Gertz Court balanced the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms
of speech and press and "the individual's right to the protection of his
own good name."'6 1 The Court noted that extending the protection of the
New York Times privilege to expressions concerning public officials and
public figures was justified because there was only a "limited state interest" in protecting the reputations of public persons. 62 In the case of
private individuals, however, the Court found that the state's interest in
providing remedies for harm to reputation was "strong and legitimate" 63
because "private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than
public officials and public figures; they are also more deserving of recov54. Id. at 999.
55. The Rosenbloom decision was announced June 7, 1971. Gertz' appeal to the Seventh
Circuit was decided August 1, 1972.
56. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
57. "We granted certiorari to reconsider the extent of a publisher's constitutional privilege against liability for defamation of a private citizen." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325.
58. Id. at 347.
59. Id at 349.
60. Id. at 350; see supra notes 33-36 & accompanying text.
61. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341.
62. Id. at 343.
63. Id. at 348-49. The Court held that the state interest in protecting private individuals
was greater for a number of reasons. First, private individuals have less access to media to
counteract the falsehood and thus are more vulnerable. Second, private individuals have not
assumed the risk of greater scrutiny and are therefore more deserving of protection. Finally,
the Court noted the need for communications media to be able to act in accordance with these
assumptions with regard to public figures, even if they do not apply in every case. Id. at 34445.
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ery." 64 Thus, a less demanding standard of liability
could apply when
65
the defamation victims were private individuals.
The Gertz Court also held, however, that such private individuals
could recover only actual damages under this less demanding standard,
because the "strong and legitimate state interest" extended no further
than compensation for "actual injury. '"66 Presumed and punitive damages were not compensation for actual injury to reputation, and jury discretion to award such damages in unpredictable amounts "unnecessarily
exacerbate[d] the danger of. . . self-censorship. ' 67 Moreover, punitive
damages in particular were "wholly irrelevant to the state interest" justi68
fying a negligence standard in private defamation actions.
Gertz thus rejected the Rosenbloom approach by reviving the distinction between public and private individuals and by refusing to fully
extend the Times "actual malice" requirement to defamation actions
brought by private individuals. 69 Instead, Gertz permitted the states to
set a lower standard for the recovery of actual damages by private plaintiffs, while it maintained the "actual malice" requirement for the award70
ing of presumed and punitive damages.
While Gertz settled the standard of liability to be applied in actions
by private individuals against media defendants, the Court did not decide
whether the Gertz rules would apply in actions brought by private individuals against nonmedia defendants.7 1 While dicta in a number of cases
suggested that the Court would not distinguish between media and
73
nonmedia defendants, 72 the Court explicitly reserved this question.
64. Id. at 345.
65. Id. at 347-48.
66. Id. at 348-49. "Actual injury" was broadly defined, however, to include such traditional components of presumed damages as impairment of reputation, personal humiliation,
and mental anguish and suffering. Id. at 350.
67. Id.
68. Id. (punitive damages are "private fines levied by civil juries").
69. Id. at 343-47; see supra notes 45-50 & accompanying text. The Rosenbloom distinction between matters of public and private concern was also rejected because it presented
[t]he additional difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc
basis which publications address issues of "general or public interest" and which do
not-to determine, in the words of MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, "what information
is relevant to self-government.". .. We doubt the wisdom of committing this task to
the conscience of judges.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346 (quoting Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
70. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-49.
71. The language of the opinion was ambiguous; the Court referred to defamers as either
"defendants" or "publishers and broadcasters." See id. passim.
72. See infra note 177.
73. "[W]hether the New York Times standard can apply to an individual defendant
rather than to a media defendant" is a question the "Court has never decided." Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133 n. 16 (1979); see infra note 177. See generally Shiffrin, Defamatory
Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L. REV. 915 (1978); Note,
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Lower courts reached conflicting conclusions about whether Gertz' holdings apply to actions between private, nonmedia parties. 74 Thus, it is not
clear whether Gertz or the common-law strict liability and privilege rules
control in defamation actions between private parties.
75
In 1985, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.
76
presented this question to the Supreme Court.
Greenmoss Builders
brought suit against Dun & Bradstreet for circulating a false credit report to five subscribers indicating that Greenmoss had filed for bankruptcy. Dun & Bradstreet obtained its erroneous information from a
seventeen year-old high school student it had hired to monitor county
records; the credit agency never verified the report with Greenmoss
77
Builders.
At trial, the jury found that Dun & Bradstreet had defamed Greenmoss and awarded $50,000 in presumed and $300,000 in punitive damages. Dun & Bradstreet moved for a new trial, contending that the Gertz
rule prohibited the awarding of presumed or punitive damages without a
showing of New York Times actual malice. It further contended that the
trial judge's instructions had allowed such an award on the lesser showing of negligence. 78 The trial judge agreed and ordered a new trial.
Greenmoss Builders appealed the trial court's ruling to the Vermont Superior Court, which in turn certified the questions of law to the Vermont
79
Supreme Court.
The Vermont Supreme Court ruled that the Gertz proscription
against awarding presumed and punitive damages upon a lesser showing
Mediaocracy and Mistrust: Extending New York Times Defamation Protection to Nonmedia
Defendants, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1876 (1982).
74. Compare, e.g., Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 318 N.W.2d 141 (1982) (Gertz inapplicable in actions between private plaintiffs and nonmedia defendants), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
883 (1982) and Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 279 Or. 361, 568 P.2d 1359
(1977) (same) with Antwerp Diamond Exchange v. Better Business Bureau, 130 Ariz. 523, 637
P.2d 733 (1981) (Gertz applicable in such actions) and Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md.
580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976) (same).
75. 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
76. The Vermont Supreme Court had determined that Dun & Bradstreet was a nonmedia
defendant, Greenmoss, 143 Vt. 66, 73-74, 461 A.2d 414, 417-18 (1983), afl'd, 105 S. Ct. 2939
(1985), and held that Gertz did not apply to actions against nonmedia defendants. Id. at 75,
461 A.2d at 418.
In scheduling Greenmoss for reargument, the Court directed the parties to address
whether Gertz' restrictions on presumed and punitive damages should apply to nonmedia defendants. 52 U.S.L.W. at 3937 (U.S. June 26, 1984) (No. 83-18).
77. Greenmoss, 143 Vt. at 71, 461 A.2d at 416. In fact, a former Greenmoss employee
had filed for bankruptcy. It was Dun & Bradstreet's "routine practice" to check all reports of
bankruptcy with the company involved. This procedure was not followed with Greenmoss
Builders. Id.
78. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2942.
79. Greenmoss, 143 Vt. at 70, 461 A.2d at 415.
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than "actual malice" applied only to media defendants. s0 The Vermont
court determined that credit reporting agencies are nonmedia parties because they "are in the business of selling financial information to a limited number of subscribers who have paid substantial fees for their
services.""' It therefore concluded that the award of presumed and punitive damages against Dun & Bradstreet did not violate Gertz.82 The
Supreme Court, recognizing disagreement among lower courts as to
83
when the Gertz standard applied, granted certiorari.
Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss
As is typical in defamation cases, no single rationale commanded a
majority of the Court in Dun & Bradstreet,Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc. 84 The Court affirmed the Vermont Supreme Court's decision that
Gertz85 did not apply, "although for reasons different from those relied
upon by the Vermont Supreme Court."' 86 The plurality opinion, written
by Justice Powell, held that Gertz' restrictions on the recovery of pre80. Id. at 75, 461 A.2d at 418. The Vermont court noted that the majority of jurisdictions that had decided the issue had refused to "extend" Gertz, and that
[t]he crucial elements.., which brought the United States Supreme Court into the
field of defamation law are missing. There is no threat to the free and robust debate
of public issues; there is no potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas
concerning self-government; and there is no threat of liability causing a reaction of
self-censorship by the press.
Id. at 74, 461 A.2d at 418 (quoting Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 279 Or.
361, 366, 568 P.2d 1359, 1362-63 (1977)). The Supreme Court also used part of this language
in Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2946.
81. Greenmoss, 143 Vt. at 73, 461 A.2d at 417. The court found a "clear distinction
between a publication which disseminates news for public consumption and one which provides specialized information to a selective, finite audience." Id. A majority of the circuit
courts have held that credit reporting agencies are nonmedia and undeserving of constitutional
protection. See Millstone v. O'Hanlon Reports, Inc., 528 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1976); Hood v.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 985 (1974); Oberman v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 460 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1972); Kansas Elec. Supply Co. v. Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc., 448 F.2d 647 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1026 (1972); C.R.
Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 438 F.2d 433 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 898 (1971).
82. Greenmoss, 143 Vt. at 75, 461 A.2d at 418.
83. 464 U.S. 959 (1983). The case was calendared for reargument, 468 U.S. 1214 (1984).
84. 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985). Justice Powell wrote the plurality opinion affirming the Vermont Supreme Court, joined by Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor. Id. at 2941. Chief Justice
Burger concurred in the result, but felt compelled to write separately that he agreed with
Justice White's concurrence. Id. at 2948 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice also
added a touch of humor to the otherwise serious debate: "Consideration of these issues inevitably recalls the aphorism of journalism ... that, 'too much checking on the facts has ruined
many a good news story.' " Id. Justice White concurred in the result, but took the view that
Gertz should be overruled and the New York Times standard modified. Id. (White, J., concurring). Justice Brennan wrote the dissent, in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens
joined. Id. at 2954 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85. 418 U.S. 323 (1974); see supra notes 58-70 & accompanying text.
86. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2942. It is possible that the Court affirmed the Vermont
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the
sumed and punitive damages were not applicable in this case because' 87
defamatory expression did not involve an "issue of public concern."
Justice Powell began by reviewing the holdings of New York Times
v. Sullivan8 8 and its progeny through Gertz, observing that all of these
cases involved matters of "undoubted" public concern. 89 He noted that
"nothing in the Gertz opinion" suggested that the balance Gertz struck
between free speech and the individual's right to the protection of his
reputation would apply regardless of the type of speech involved and
concluded that the Court had "never considered whether the Gertz balance obtains when the defamatory statements involve no issue of public
concern." 90 It was necessary, therefore, for the Court to strike a new
balance between the state interest in protecting the good name of private
individuals and the constitutional interest in protecting speech involving
matters of purely private concern.
Justice Powell balanced these interests and concluded that defamations not involving a matter of public concern did not warrant the constitutional protection provided by the Gertz restrictions on the awarding of
presumed and punitive damages. Justice Powell acknowledged that the
state interest in protecting the reputation of a private individual was
"identical" in Greenmoss and in Gertz. The first amendment interest implicated in Greenmoss, however, was "less important" than that in Gertz
because the expression involved a matter of solely private concern. Justice Powell noted that, while the Court frequently had reaffirmed that
"speech on public issues occupies the 'highest rung of the hierarchy of
First Amendment values,' "91 not all speech is of equal first amendment
importance. Justice Powell noted that various types of communication
are regulated without offending the first amendment. 92 Because "speech
Supreme Court for precisely those reasons. In the Vermont court's discussion of Gertz' applicability, it concluded:
Because a private individual's right to recover for libel has been made more difficult
in situations in which his interests have been at least partially out-weighed by important constitutional values, it does not follow, for obvious reasons, that his recovery
should be made more difficult in situationsin which no such constitutionalvalues are
involved. . . . It is our conclusion that Gertz does not require application of the
constitutional privilege to actions of defamation between private parties insofaras the
issues raised here are concerned.

Greenmoss, 143 Vt. at 74,461 A.2d at 418 (emphasis added) (quoting Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 279 Or. 361, 370-71, 568 P.2d 1359, 1365 (1977)). "In light of the
above [the court was] convinced that the balance must be struck in favor of the private plaintiff
defamed by a nonmedia defendant." Greenmoss, 143 Vt. at 75, 461 A.2d at 418.
87. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2946.
88. 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see supra notes 24-33 & accompanying text.
89. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2943-44.
90. Id. at 2944.
91. Id. at 2946 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)).
92. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2945-46 & n.5; see infra notes 125-28, 135-40 & accompanying text.
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on matters of purely private concern is of less First Amendment concern," Justice Powell concluded that such speech did not merit the constitutional protection provided by Gertz.93 Consequently, presumed and
punitive damages could be awarded absent a showing of actual malice.
The Court then found that the Greenmoss credit report did not involve a matter of public concern because "it was speech solely in the
'94
individual interest of the speaker and its specific business audience."
An evaluation of the "content, form, and context" indicated that the
credit report concerned no public issue and warranted no special protection. 9 5 Justice Powell also noted that the limited circulation of the credit
report precluded any claim of a "strong interest in the free flow of commercial information" 96 and that there was no credible argument that the
credit report required special protection to ensure that debate on public
issues would be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." ' 97 Thus, the Court
concluded that the erroneous credit report implicated a matter of only
private concern, and permitting recovery of presumed and punitive damages for its dissemination therefore did not offend the first amendment.
In sum, the Greenmoss plurality held that Gertz' proscription
against the awarding of presumed and punitive damages without a showing of actual malice does not apply to the expression of a matter of private concern9 8 because such expressions are of less first amendment
importance and therefore warrant reduced constitutional protection.
Since the credit report in this case involved a matter of solely private
concern, presumed and punitive damages could be awarded without a
showing of actual malice.
Analysis of the Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Decision
The reasoning of the Greenmoss99 decision is unsound for several
reasons. First, the plurality's rationale is based upon a strained and artificial interpretation of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.100 Second, the plurality's reading of Gertz conflicts with the policy upon which Gertz is based
and with Gertz' clear rejection of the Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 101
93. Greenmoss, 105 S.Ct. at 2946 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1983));
see infra notes 123-55 & accompanying text.
94. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2947.
95. Id. (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983)).
96. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2947 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976)).
97. Greenmoss, 105 S.Ct. at 2497 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 270 (1964)).
98. The opinion did not discuss whether Gertz' requirement of some degree of fault was
applicable in such situations.
99. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S.Ct. 2939 (1985).
100. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
101. 403 U.S. 29 (1971); see supra notes 45-50 & accompanying text.
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approach. Third, even if the plurality correctly construed Gertz as applying only when the expression involves a matter of public concern, its
characterization of speech on matters of private concern as deserving less
constitutional protection than speech on matters of public concern is supported neither by Gertz nor any of the other first amendment cases cited
in the Greenmoss opinion. Finally, even if distinguishing expressions on
matters of public concern from expressions on matters of private concern
is appropriate, the plurality incorrectly concluded that the credit report
does not implicate a matter of public concern. The result is an unsound
decision that fails to resolve the question left open by Gertz and instead
raises many new questions.
The Applicability of Gertz to Expressions on Matters of Private Concern
Justice Powell's view that the Gertz restrictions on the recovery of
presumed and punitive damages were intended to apply only when the
subject matter of the defamation involves a matter of public concern
finds little support in the text of the Gertz opinion. 102 Justice Brennan,
writing for the four dissenters, pointed out that
[o]ne searches Gertz in vain for a single word to support the proposition that limits on presumed and punitive damages obtained only
when speech involved matters of public concern. Gertz could not have
been grounded in such a premise. Distrust of placing in the courts the
power to decide what speech was of public concern was precisely the
rationale Gertz offered for rejecting the Rosenbloom plurality
approach. 103
Even Justice White, who concurred in the Greenmoss result and joined
Justice Powell's interpretation of Gertz, candidly admitted that he "had
thought that the decision in Gertz was intended to reach cases that involve any false statements of fact injurious to reputation.., whether or
not it implicates a matter of public importance." 10 4
The view that Gertz was intended to apply only when the expression
implicated a matter of public concern also disregards Gertz' repudiation
of Rosenbloom's "public or general interest" test. Gertz rejected this
standard because a judicial determination of this issue was necessarily
arbitrary and impracticable1 0 5 and because such a test "inadequately
serve[d] both of the competing values at stake. ' 10 6 The "public or gen102. Justice Powell was joined by Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor. In addition, Chief
Justice Burger wrote: "I agree that Gertz is limited to circumstances in which the alleged
defamatory expression concerns a matter of general public importance .... Greenmoss, 105
S. Ct. at 2948 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
103. Id. at 2959 n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 2952-53 (White, J., concurring).
105. See supra notes 51-68 & accompanying text.
106. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346; see supra notes 69-70 & accompanying text.
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eral interest" standard failed to protect either the reputation of the private individual or the speaker's freedom of expression, because
[o]n the one hand, a private individual whose reputation is injured
by defamatory falsehood that does concern an issue of public or general interest has no recourse unless he can meet the rigorous requirements of New York Times. . . . On the other hand, a publisher or
broadcaster of a defamatory error which a court deems unrelated to an
issue of public or general interest may be held liable in damages even if
reasonable precaution to ensure the accuracy of its
it took every
0 7
assertions.'

Justice Powell's argument that Gertz was intended to apply only to
expressions on matters of public concern thus is clearly inconsistent with
that opinion's explicit rationale. The Gertz Court rejected basing the degree of constitutional protection on the subject matter of the expression.
Instead, Gertz focused on the status of the defamed individual and created an exception to the New York Times actual malice rule that permitted the states to impose a less demanding standard of liability in actions
brought by the more vulnerable, and more deserving, private plaintiffs. 108
By construing Gertz as applying only when the expression involves a
matter of public concern, Justice Powell could permit the awarding of
presumed and punitive damages absent a showing of actual malice with-

out appearing to overrule Gertz. 109 Since Gertz, according to the Greenmoss plurality, only applies when the defamation involved some issue of
public concern, the balance Gertz struck between the state's interest in
protecting the private individual's reputation and the constitutional interest in preserving free expression does not control in cases in which no
matter of public concern is implicated. The Greenmoss Court thus was
free to strike a new balance between the "identical" state interest and the
"less important" first amendment interest 0 0 that permits the award of
presumed and punitive damages without a showing of actual malice.
The plurality's narrow view of the applicability of Gertz is flawed in
another important respect: Gertz categorically rejected all awards of presumed and punitive damages absent a showing of "actual malice," "' and
it rejected them for broad policy reasons unrelated to either the content
107. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346 (emphasis added).
108. The Court specifically noted that "[t]his conclusion is not based on a belief that the
considerations which prompted the adoption of the New York Times privilege for defamation
of public officials . . . and public figures are wholly inapplicable to the context of private
individuals." Id. at 348. "The countervailing state interest extends no further than compensation for actual injury," however. Id. at 349.
109. Justice Powell argued that "properly understood, Gertz is consistent with the result
we reach today." Greenmoss, 105 S.Ct. at 2944 n.4.
110. Id. at 2945.
111. "[T]he States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages ... when
liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth."
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
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of the defamation or the status of the parties. The basis for Gertz' ruling
was not that the states' interests in protecting the reputations of private
individuals were insufficient to justify awards of presumed and punitive
damages, as Justice Powell suggests."t 2 Rather, it was the Gertz Court's
recognition that jury awards of presumed'13 and punitive 1 4 damages
"unnecessarily compound[ed] the potential of... inhibit[ing] the vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms."''-, The Gertz Court also
reasoned that the potential for abuse by juries, both by awarding damages bearing no relation to the actual harm caused and by using such
awards to punish unpopular views, was too great. 116 The availability of
these awards presented an unacceptable risk of self-censorship.
The Gertz Court found that punitive damages, in particular, were
"wholly irrelevant to the state interest that justifies a negligence standard
for private defamation actions."" 7 Punitive damage awards did not
compensate for actual injury; rather, they were "private fines levied by
civil juries."' " 8 Justice Harlan, in the Rosenbloom dissent that provided
the basis for Gertz,119 argued that permitting unrestricted punitive damage awards was particularly inappropriate in a first amendment context.
He reasoned that the imposition of punitive damages should be limited to
cases in which actual malice was proved because that was
112. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2946.
113. See supra note 19 & accompanying text. The Gertz Court noted that the doctrine of
presumed damages allowed jurors to award money damages in excess of any actual injury and
invited them to "punish unpopular opinion rather than to compensate individuals for injury
sustained by the publication of a false fact." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349. For these reasons, the
Court restricted the circumstances under which presumed damages could be awarded.
Gertz broadened the definition of "actual damages," however, to encompass such traditionally presumed damages as "impairment of reputation and standing in the community,
personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering." Id. at 350. While requiring that
"competent" evidence of these injuries be presented, the Court ruled that no evidence of their
monetary value was necessary. Id. Gertz thus restricted both the jury's authority and the need
to presume damages.
114. The Gertz Court found "no justification" for awarding punitive damages awards
when liability was not established under New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Gertz 418 U.S. at 350.
115. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
116. Id. at 349-50.
117. Id. at 350 (emphasis added).
118. Id.
119. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2956 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan dissented from
Rosenbloom's extension of the New York Times standard to private individuals when a matter
of public or general concern was implicated. He proposed, instead, that when private plaintiffs
were involved, "the States should be free to define for themselves the applicable standard of
care so long as they do not impose liability without fault." Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 64
(Harlan, J., dissenting). He also argued that presumed damages should be eliminated, id., and
punitive damages restricted to instances when actual malice is proved. Id. at 73. With the
exception of restricting rather than eliminating presumed damages, this is the approach the
Court adopted in Gertz
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the typical standard employed in assessing anyone's liability for punitive damages where the underlying aim of the law is to compensate for
harm actually caused .... and no conceivablestate interest could justify
imposing a harsher standard on the exercise of those
freedoms that are
1 20
given explicit protection by the First Amendment.

In upholding the awarding of presumed and punitive damages upon
a lesser showing than actual malice, Greenmoss is inconsistent with
Gertz. Gertz' holding was clear and unequivocal: "the private defamation plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding standard
than that stated by New York Times may recover only such damages as
are sufficient to compensate him for actual injury."' 2 1 Gertz held that the
unrestricted awarding of presumed and punitive damages presented a serious threat to the exercise of first amendment freedoms. The Greenmoss
plurality, by holding that Gertz does not apply to expressions on matters
of private concern, has, in Justice Brennan's words, simply "cut away the
22
protective mantle of Gertz."1
Reduced First Amendment Protection for Expressions
on Matters of Private Concern

The Greenmoss plurality reasoned that expressions on matters of
private concern do not warrant the protections afforded by Gertz' restrictions on the awarding of presumed and punitive damages because such
expressions have less first amendment value. 12 3 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Powell observed that "speech on public issues occupies the
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values and is entitled
to special protection."'' 24 Fighting words I25 and obscene speech, 26 by
contrast, are at the lowest rung of this first amendment hierarchy and
120. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 73 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Harlan
went on to consider whether further limitations on the awarding of punitive damages were
appropriate, concluding that providing punitive damages when actual malice was shown was
necessary to deter "morally blameworthy" conduct. Id.
121. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
122. Greenmoss, 105 S.Ct. at 2957 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 2946.
124. Id. at 2945 (citations omitted). A politically based interpretation of the first amendment, under which speech relevant to self-government is absolutely protected and speech not
implicating self-government is subject to regulation, has been advanced in various forms by
many commentators. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (1960); BeVier, The
First Amendment and PoliticalSpeech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle,
30 STAN. L. REV.299 (1978); Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The CentralMeaning
of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191; Meiklejohn, Public Speech and the First
Amendment, 55 GEo. L.J. 234 (1966); see also Brennan, The Supreme Court and the
Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1965).
125. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
126. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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receive no first amendment protection whatsoever. 127 "Commercial
speech" occupies a middle rung in Justice Powell's hierarchy and provides "the most prominent example of reduced protection for certain
128
kinds of speech."
Justice Powell argued by analogy that credit reporting falls into the
commercial speech category' 29 and thus "occupies a subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values."' 130 Commercial speech, or
advertising that does "no more than propose a commercial transaction,"' 131 may be regulated by the state because of two unique qualities:
advertising's greater verifiability and its "hardiness."' 132 Justice Powell
reasoned that credit reporting, like commercial speech, is "hardy" because it is motivated solely by the desire for profit. Moreover, the credit
report was "arguably" more objectively verifiable than "speech deserving
of greater protection.' 1 33 Thus, according reduced constitutional protection to credit reporting was appropriate.
The similarities between credit reporting and commercial speech,
however, do not warrant the creation of a broad category of expression,
"matters of private concern," to which the first amendment protections
of Gertz do not apply. At most, the similarities might suggest that subjecting credit reporting to the same sort of regulation as commercial
speech would not offend the first amendment. Nothing in Justice Powell's opinion, however, demonstrates how expressions on matters of private concern may be "hardier," or more objectively verifiable, than
expressions involving matters of public concern. No reasonable basis for
differentiating between expressions on matters of public concern and
those on matters of private concern can be drawn from the superficial
similarities between credit reporting and commercial speech.' 34
Justice Powell also pointed to a number of other examples of "com127. Other categories also lack first amendment protection. See New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornography); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (incitement to
riot). Such expressions "by their very utterance inflict injury." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 572 k1942).
128. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2945 n.5.
129. Id. at 2947 & n.8.
130. Id. at 2945 n.5 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)).
131. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973).
132. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771
n.24 (1976). "Since advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and foregone entirely. . . . Attributes such as
... the greater objectivity and hardiness of commercial speech, may make it less necessary to
tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker." Id.
133.

Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2947.

134. Justice Brennan noted that the Court has not extended the commercial speech doctrine (allowing regulation of false or misleading speech) beyond advertising because, "often,
vitally important speech will be uttered to advance economic interests and because the profit
motive making such speech hardy dissipates rapidly when the speech is not advertising." Id.
at 2963 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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munications that are regulated without offending the First Amendment"'13 5 to support the conclusion that speech on matters of private
concern is not worthy of Gertz' constitutional safeguards. These cases
involve insider trading, 13 6 deceptive proxy statements, 137 unlawful price
fixing, 138 and an employer's threats of retaliation against a recalcitrant
union. 139 These examples, chosen from business or commercial contexts,
were intended to suggest that matters of private concern, such as credit
reports, have little first amendment value.
This analogy is not credible. These cases do not involve the regulation of speech, but rather involve the regulation of commercial or business practices of which speech is but a component. In one such case, the
Court observed that "it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by
means of language.. .140 These cases permitted regulation of conduct,
not speech, and thus do not support the reduction of first amendment
protection for expressions on matters of private concern.
Finally, Justice Powell relied on a public employment discrimination case, Connick v. Myers, 141 for the proposition that "speech on mat1 42
ters of purely private concern is of less First Amendment concern.'
This reliance is misplaced for two reasons. First, Connick, which upheld
the dismissal of an assistant district attorney for circulating an inflammatory questionnaire, specifically limited the distinction it drew between
expressions on matters of public concern and expressions on matters of
43
private concern to the context of government employment situations.
is
Second, extending the Connick distinction to the defamation area144
cases,
amendment
first
employment
public
in
because
inappropriate
the state's interests as an employer, in regulating the speech of its employees, "differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with
135.

Id. at 2945 n.5 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)).

136.

Securities Exchange Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.

1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
137.
138.
139.
140.

Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949).

141.

461 U.S. 138 (1983).

142. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2946 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 146-47).
143. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147 & 148 n.8. The Court pointed out: "We hold only that
when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as
an employee upon matters only of personal interest," the State's interest in preventing disruption or impairment of its operations may outweigh its employee's first amendment rights. Id.
at 147.
144. See Connick, 461 U.S. 138; Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Givhan v. Western
Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Pickering v. Board of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general." 145 The state, as an
employer, has a strong interest in ensuring "the effective and efficient
fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public." 146 While this interest is
not strong enough to permit the regulation of employee speech on matters of public concern, 147 the state's interest in preventing the impairment
of its operations may outweigh its employee's first amendment rights
when the expression relates only to a matter of personal interest.148
In determining whether a particular discharge violated an employee's first amendment rights, a court must balance, on a case by case
basis, the nature of the employee's expression against the degree of interference with the operations of the office or agency.1 49 The state's burden
in justifying a particular discharge varies in each case. When an issue of
"political, social, or other concern to the community"1 50 is implicated by
the employee's expression, the state must show a greater extent of interference. 15 1 In Connick, the Court characterized the employee's expression of her personal grievances as "speech on matters of purely private
concern."' 152 Accordingly, the Court held that her first amendment interest was outweighed by the district attorney's interest in the efficient
functioning of his office.
In the defamation area, however, no state interest in providing essential services to the public is implicated, and courts do not explicitly
balance the public welfare against the employee's first amendment interests on a case by case basis. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 153 and its
progeny struck a fixed balance between the state's interest in providing
remedies for defamed public officials and public figures and the speaker's
first amendment interest, 154 and Gertz balanced the state's greater interest in protecting the reputations of defamed private individuals against
this same first amendment interest. 155 The Connick distinction between
speech on matters of public concern and speech on matters of private
concern is thus inappropriate in defamation cases. Greenmoss' denial of
the protection of Gertz' restrictions on the awarding of presumed and
145.
(1968)).
146.
147.
148.
relating
officials
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Connick, 461 U.S. at 140 (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568
Connick, 461 U.S. at 150.
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968).
Connick 461 U.S. at 147. "When employee expression cannot be fairly considered as
to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, government
should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices .... Id. at 146.
Id. at 150-51.
Id. at 146.
rd. at 150.
Id.at 154.
276 U.S. 254 (1964).
See supra notes 29-33 & accompanying text.
See supra notes 61-68 & accompanying text.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[V/ol. 37

punitive damages to expressions on matters of private concern is not supported by the Connick decision.
Expressions on Matters of Public Concern
Even if it were appropriate to differentiate between expressions on
matters of public concern and matters of private concern in defamation
cases, the plurality incorrectly concluded that a credit report does not
involve a matter of public concern. Justice Powell did not specifically
analyze the credit report's "content, form, and context ... as revealed by
the entire record."1 56 Rather, in a cursory, two-paragraph discussion, he
noted that the speech was made in the interests of both the speaker and
its small business audience and thus deserved no protection when it was
false and caused harm.1 5 7 He also pointed out that no claim of a "strong
interest in the free flow of commercial information" is implicated when
1 58
circulation of the false statement of fact is contractually limited.
Therefore, Justice Powell concluded, the credit report did not involve a
matter of public concern and did not warrant the constitutional protection of Gertz' restrictions on the awarding of presumed and punitive

damages. 159
This "smorgasbord of reasons" 1 60 why the credit report does not
involve a matter of public concern failed to analyze the particular content of the publication. The credit report purported to be a timely announcement of a local company's bankruptcy. This information is
certainly a matter of public concern to the community in which the company is located; all of its citizens have some interest in the health of the
local economy. Moreover, the company's employees, creditors, and potential customers have a particularly strong interest in the company's
financial standing. Indeed, the Federal Bankruptcy Code requires that
1 61
such bankruptcies be made a matter of public record.
While Justice Powell found that the content of speech made solely in
the interests of the speaker and its business audience concerned no public
interest,162 the Court has often acknowledged that speech on economic
matters is of significant public concern.163 In Virginia State Board of
156. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct at 2947 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48).
157. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2947.
158. Id. (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976)).
159. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2947-48.
160. Id. at 2959 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
161. 11 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).

162. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2947.
163. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976); see also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952); AFL v.
Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 325-26 (1941); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-03 (1940).
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Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,164 the Court
stressed the importance of the consumer's "keen" interest in the free flow
of commercial information 165 and the "public interest" that is served by
the more intelligent and well-informed private economic decisions that
result from this flow of information.' 66 Justice Douglas once observed
that "speech directed at private economic decisionmaking... [cannot] be
regarded as less important than political expression."' 1 67
The "form and context"'' 6 8 of the credit report also indicate that it
involved a matter of public concern. Justice Powell noted that the credit
report was circulated to five subscribers who were contractually limited
from disseminating it further 69 and concluded that any claim of a
"strong interest in the free flow of information" was thus precluded.' 70
The limits on the credit report's distribution, however, do not necessarily render its subject matter of less public concern.' 7' Moreover, the
credit report has been recognized as a significant form of economic information;1 72 in fact, most states provide a qualified privilege for credit
reporting.173
Finally, Justice Powell observed that the credit report "warrants no
special protection when ... [it] is wholly false and clearly damaging to
the victim's business reputation."'' 74 This observation not only fails to
shed any light on whether the expression implicates a matter of public
164. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
165. Id. at 763.
166. Id. at 765. The Virginia PharmacyCourt was explaining why commercial speech is
entitled to first amendment protection, even if it does not appear to be of public interest or
importance on its face. Id. at 764-65.
167. Dun & Bradstreet v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 905 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
168. The "form and context" criteria offer a particularly inapposite standard for use in
defamation cases because they are intended to take into account the potential of an employee's
speech to undermine the authority of a superior. See Connick 461 U.S. at 138.
169. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2941, 2947.
170. Id. at 2947.
171. In fact, the Court held in a first amendment public employment case that first amendment protections were not diminished for an expression on a matter of public concern that was
made in private instead of in public. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S.
410, 415-16 (1979).
172. In a similar case, Justice Douglas observed that:
When immersed in a free flow of commercial information, private sector decisionmaking is at least as effective an institution as are our various governments in
furthering the social interest in obtaining the best general allocation of resources....
The financial data circulated by Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., are part of the fabric of
national commercial communication.
Dun & Bradstreet v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 905-06 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (citations omitted).
173. Maurer, Common Law Defamation and the FairCredit Reporting Act, 72 GEO. L.J.
95, 100 (1983).
174. Greenmoss, 105 S.Ct. at 2947.
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concern; it also conflicts with the policy underlying the constitutional
protections for defamation. Gertz held that while "there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact . . . [t]he First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that
matters."'' 75 Although the credit report was false, speech on such economic matters may implicate matters of public concern in various ways
and therefore warrants the protections of Gertz.
Thus, the plurality incorrectly concluded that the credit report did
not implicate a matter of public concern. The content of the expression
was a report of the bankruptcy of a local business, and such economic
information may be of wide public interest. The form of the expression,
a credit report, and the context in which it was circulated, a limited and
confidential setting, do not render the subject matter of less public concern. Rather, they merely reflect one of the myriad ways that economic
information is disseminated and used. Because the credit report at issue
implicated a matter of public concern, Gertz' restrictions on the awarding
of presumed and punitive damages should have applied in the Greenmoss
case.
Questions Raised by the Greenmoss Decision
The Greenmoss decision is a poorly conceived approach to the problem of providing adequate protection for the reputation of the private
individual. 76 The decision did not resolve the question left open by
Gertz; it is still not clear whether Gertz or the common-law standard of
liability applies in actions brought by private individual plaintiffs against
nonmedia defendants. Instead, Greenmoss followed an approach that
raises new questions and casts doubt on what appeared to be well-settled
principles.
The question of whether the Gertz requirements applied to actions
brought by private individual plaintiffs against nonmedia defendants was
squarely before the Court. The view that the distinction between media
and nonmedia defendants is irrelevant in defamation cases appears to
command a majority of the Court, 177 but the plurality expressly declined
175. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340-41.
176. The decision appears to be a compromise between the members of the Court who
wanted to overrule Gertz and those who would hold it applicable in all defamation cases involving private plaintiffs.
177. As Justice Brennan pointed out:
[A]t least six Members of this Court (the four who join this opinion and JUSTICE
WHITE and THE CHIEF JUSTICE) agree today that, in the context of defamation
law, the rights of the institutional media are no greater and no less than those enjoyed by other individuals or organizations engaged in the same activities.
Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2959 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, the Court's decisions have not distinguished between media and nonmedia
defendants; in fact, they have consistently asserted that "[tihe inherent worth of... speech in
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to decide the case on these grounds. 178 The Greenmoss Court thus rejected the opportunity to settle a lingering question of law.
The most obvious question raised by the Greenmoss approach is
whether Gertz' proscription against imposing liability without fault is
also inapplicable when the expression does not implicate a matter of public concern. In his concurrence, Justice White ventured that, "[a]lthough
Justice Powell speaks only of the inapplicability of the Gertz rule with
respect to presumed and punitive damages, it must be that the Gertz requirement of some kind of fault on the part of the defendant is also inap179
plicable in cases [in which no matter of public concern is implicated]."
There is, however, some contrary indication that expressions on matters
of private concern are still protected by the Gertz rule proscribing strict

liability: Justice Powell held that, while speech involving matters of private concern "is not totally unprotected by the First Amendment[,]...

its protections are less stringent." 180 Lower courts likely will differ over
whether Greenmoss has eliminated the Gertz requirement of some showing of fault for cases in which the expression does not involve a matter of
public concern, and the Supreme Court eventually will have to clarify

this issue.
Another question raised by the Greenmoss rationale is whether its
ruling permitting the recovery of presumed and punitive damages without proof of actual malice extends to both public officials and public
terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source,
whether corporation, association, union, or individual." First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978). The Court has acknowledged that the informative functions of the
press are also performed by writers, artists, lecturers, and various other individuals, Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 705 (1972), and that the first amendment gives every citizen an equal
right to self-expression and an active role in government. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,
459-63 (1980); Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 100-102 (1972).
Both Justice White and Justice Brennan make the additional point that providing greater
protection for the potentially widest disseminators of falsehood would be "paradoxical."
Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct at 2953 (White, J., concurring); id. at 2957-58 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Brennan observed that rapidly changing communications technology
increasingly blurs the distinction between media and nonmedia, making such a distinction an
"anachronism." Id. at 2957-58 & n.7.
178. Greenmoss, 105 S.Ct. at 2959 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 2953 (White, J., concurring). The argument in favor of this interpretation
would be as follows: Gertz, according to the Greenmoss plurality, only set forth rules for recovery when the expression involved a matter of public concern; therefore, Gertz' holding is
irrelevant to cases involving expressions on matters of private concern. Liability without a
showing of fault may therefore be imposed in such cases.
180. Id. at 2946 (emphasis added). Another argument in favor of the continued proscription of strict liability is suggested by Greenmoss' ruling that the state interest in providing
presumed and punitive damages awards for victims of defamations involving matters of private
concern was less "substantial" than it was in Gertz, because such statements had reduced
constitutional value. Id. at 2946. While the state interest may be more substantial under
these circumstances, it may still not be strong enough to support the imposition of liability
without fault.
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figures.' 8 1 If the Court intends only to protect "speech that matters,"
may public officials or public figures recover presumed and punitive damages without a showing of actual malice whenever a court deems them to
have been defamed by a matter not of public concern?18 2 This interpretation would seem to present a clear conflict with the rule of New York
Times and its progeny that public officials and public figures may recover
damages only upon a showing of "actual malice."' 8 3 Greenmoss distinguished Gertz on the basis that the earlier case involved an "expression
on a matter of undoubted public concern,"' 1 4 however, and New York
Times and its progeny could be distinguished on the same grounds.
Finally, a major area of uncertainty will result from the application
of the test for distinguishing between matters of public concern and matters of private concern. Although Justice Powell purported to determine
whether the credit report implicated a matter of public concern by evaluating its "content, form, and context ... as revealed by the entire record," 85 his conclusory application of this test did not explain what
elements are involved in these criteria and how much weight is to be
given to each. 1 86 Furthermore, the test is adapted from a public employment case,' 87 and the precedent provided by cases in that area is not
apposite here.' 8 8 The general nature of the test invites ad hoc, subjective
rulings. The only certain results of this "new" Greenmoss distinction between matters of public concern and matters of private concern will be
the uncertain administration of justice and precisely the sort of local pun181. Such a rule could present the anomaly of a public official or public figure recovering
presumed and punitive but not actual damages.
182. Nothing in the Greenmoss opinion suggests that its distinction between expressions on
matters of public concern and matters of private concern applies only to private plaintiffs.
Matters that would certainly be of private concern if involving private individuals might be
held to be of public concern if they involved public officials, however: "The public official rule
protects the paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning
public officials, their servants. To this end, anything which might touch on an official's fitness
for office is relevant." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964).
183. See Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
184. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2944.
185. Id. at 2947 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48).
186. That Justice Powell, Justice Brennan in dissent, and this Comment apply the same
test and reach differing conclusions about the public or private nature of the credit report is
not surprising, given the subjectivity of the criteria and the absence of any specific guidelines or
precedent. This discrepancy suggests how courts will reach inconsistent results.
187. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.
188. In its line of public employment cases, the Court differentiates between expressions
on matters of public concern- which the employer cannot influence or suppress through disciplinary action or termination, and private expressions related to the employment environment-which the employer may respond to without fear of violating the employee's first
amendment rights. See supra notes 144-51 & accompanying text.
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ishment of unpopular expressions that the Gertz decision was intended to
foreclose.
The effect of the Greenmoss decision, then, is to create considerable
new uncertainty. It is not clear whether Gertz' requirement that the private individual plaintiff prove some degree of fault still applies when the
defamation does not implicate a matter of public concern. It is even possible that Greenmoss permits public officials and public figures to recover
presumed and punitive damages without showing actual malice when the
defamation involves a matter of solely private concern. And which expressions implicate matters of public concern and which do not is to be
determined through the ad hoc application of a general and subjective
test. The Greenmoss decision takes defamation back into uncertainty,
not forward into settled law.
For these reasons, the Greenmoss distinction between matters of
public concern and matters of private concern should be abandoned. 189
Gertz' requirements that no liability be imposed without fault and no
presumed or punitive damages be awarded without a showing of actual
malice should be applied to all defamation actions brought by private
individuals, regardless of either the status of the defendant or the public
or private nature of the defamation. The Gertz Court struck a considered
balance between the first amendment interest in protecting free speech
and the state interest in protecting the reputations of its private citizens.
This standard should not be discarded in favor of rendering important
first amendment protections dependent on subtle and subjective distinctions in the subject matter of the expression.
Conclusion
Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss presented the Supreme Court with
the opportunity to settle the question of whether the Gertz rule applies in
actions brought by private individuals against nonmedia defendants. Instead of resolving this open question, a plurality of the Court introduced
a vague and impractical "new" standard for determining when the constitutional protections of the Gertz rule apply. Gertz was intended to apply to all expressions, regardless of the public or private nature of their
subject matter. By restricting the protections of the Gertz rule to expressions on matters of public concern, the plurality has "cut away the pro189. The lower courts are not bound to follow principles of law that a majority of the
Court have not agreed upon. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 216 (1942). The Supreme
Court should take the first available opportunity to repudiate Greenmoss or to interpret it very
narrowly. A Court taking the latter approach might classify credit reporting, like advertising,
as speech that may be regulated when false.
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tective mantle of Gertz."'1
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